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I. INTRODUCTION 
Globalisation has been the buzzword across the world for a major part of the last 40 years or 
so. What started as a pulsating shift in the mid-1980s, turned into a tectonic movement by 
early 1990s and has advanced at unprecedented pace over the last two and half decades. 
Trade barriers have come down, linkages have been formed and strengthened, and a plethora 
of economic activities have become intertwined, across countries and continents. The global 
value chain is now a reality that none can ignore. This has been accompanied by 
technological advancements across the globe – albeit at different pace and form – changing 
the structure & organisation of the workplace. These two have gone hand in hand and fed into 
each other – globalisation helping in proliferation of technology across countries and 
technology facilitating the process of globalisation. As societies and economies became 
interconnected, it was expected that slowly a borderless global village shall emerge and usher 
in socio-economic development at a faster pace in the developing countries across the world. 
Disparities between the global North and global South, it was argued, would not disappear, 
but there would be converging tendencies. It was also hoped that as economic growth became 
more widespread, there would emerge increasing demand for labour in the developing 
economies and employment conditions would improve – both quantitatively and 
qualitatively. However, after a quarter of century, voices are being raised regarding 
inequalities and instabilities in the labour market. Against this backdrop, this paper attempts 
to explore global trends in the world of work and also examine how globalisation and 
technological changes have affected the labour market in different sets of countries over the 
last 25 years or so. 
We have mostly used the Labour Market data (ILOSTAT) obtained from International 
Labour Organisation (ILO), which has been supplemented by Economic and Social Indicators 
obtained from the World Bank and other sources (for details see Reference section). We have 
selected 194 countries for the study, which have been further clustered into geographical and 
economic groups for an exploratory analysis.1 
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II. THEORETICAL PREMISE AND EXISTING STUDIES 
The general argument For Globalisation starts with the basic Heckscher-Ohlin (Ohlin, 1933; 
Ohlin and Heckscher, 1991) structure where the developing countries have relative 
comparative advantages in production of labour-intensive commodities while the developed 
countries have advantage in production of capital-intensive commodities. In this situation, 
trade liberalisation will trigger a trend of specialization across countries where production of 
labour-intensive commodities will shift to developing countries, leading to expansion of 
employment and output therein. Liberalisation of investment policies, both domestic and 
international, would also boost economic growth as surplus capital from developed countries 
(which already face very low domestic interest rates) would flow to developing countries to 
take advantage of cheap labour power there. Employment expansion would not only be 
limited to direct job creation in the manufacturing sector, but also through expansion of the 
services sector (Lall, 2004). Once this happens, demand for even unskilled labour in 
developing countries would increase, bringing down disparities in domestic wages and 
income (Stolper and Samuelson, 1941). These arguments were splashed across the 
mainstream media in the heydays of early 1990s painting a rosy picture for the impoverished 
developing countries if only they did away with all economic shackles and barriers. 
However, other economists have countered these theories over time, advocating restraint and 
caution while embracing globalisation as a panacea. This school of thought, often termed 
(mistakenly) as Anti-Globalisation group pointed out that the concept of comparative 
advantage depends on an unrealistic assumption of homogeneous production functions across 
different countries (Grossman and Helpman, 1991). Also, the new & ‘improved’ technology 
that almost always accompanies new investment (both domestic and foreign) in developing 
countries would be frequently labour-saving in nature (Haddad and Harrison, 1993; Coe et 
al., 1997; Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Kathuria, 2001). This is so as corporations with a 
global presence would look at productivity as the key factor and global capital being cheap, 
would invest more in machines than men. As a consequence, employment gains in 
developing countries would not be as much as theoretically expected. Also, globalisation of 
the 1990s was different from that of the earlier decade in that it was not limited to 
dismantling of trade & investment barrier, but increasingly associated with structural changes 
in the developing countries. This included, but was not limited to, financial sector de-
regulation, withdrawal of state from productive activities, easier exit policies for corporates, 
and removal of social safety net. These were apprehended to create instability in the labour 
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market and increased domestic inequality, many of which were observed to be true after a 
decade (Rodrik, 2000; Milanovic, 2003). 
The net results of globalisation on domestic employment and income scenario of developing 
countries therefore would depend on the relative strengths of employment augmenting effects 
and the ‘crowding out’ or labour displacing effects and there is no univocal theoretical 
conclusion as to which would prevail. Empirical studies have pointed out that employment 
impact of globalisation is country and sector specific [Lee and Vivarelli, 2004; Basu and 
Weil, 1998; Gros, 2004]. Under such circumstances, it becomes prudent to look at the current 
trends in the world of work across the globe and enquire how globalisation has affected these 
in different sets of countries. 
III. GLOBALISATION 
To start with let us spend few words to explain what we mean by globalisation and what can 
capture the extent of globalisation. World Bank (2002) understands globalisation as growing 
integration of economies and societies around the world. Stiglitz (2002) defines globalisation 
as removal of barriers to free trade and closer integration of national economies. Thomas 
Friedman speaks of globalisation as emergence of ‘an integrated system with unique rules, 
logic, pressures and incentives driven by international capitalism with broader, faster, deeper 
flow than anytime in the past’ (Friedman, 1999). Rourke and Williamson (2000) 
conceptualised globalisation as ‘integration of international commodity markets’ and 
delineated three distinct phases in the history of economic globalisation. According to them, 
though the final decade of 15th century has been hailed by historians as the start of 
globalisation (Columbus and Vasco-da-Gama connecting Americas and Asia to Europe 
respectively), the next three centuries were practically a phase of Mercantilist protectionism 
rather than globalisation. It was the beginning of the 19th century that truly marked the start of 
the first phase of globalisation. This phase was marked by drop in transport costs and time, 
massive human migration (estimated 60 million people moved from Europe to North 
America), and flourish of international trade. It continued for almost a century till the First 
World War marked a break. The next 50 years was characterised by a retreat from 
globalisation – high import tariffs (infant industry argument?), reduced international capital 
flows, immigration restrictions, and also the Great Depression in between two World Wars. It 
was only since early 1980s that we have seen a revival of the liberal trade policies as a 
cornerstone of development agenda pushed by the international economic agencies. Since 
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then globalisation (and its criticism) has been at the centrestage of economic debates and 
discussion for nearly four decades now. 
But how to measure the extent of globalisation and how to examine whether the world is 
being more globalised or less? Celebrated British physicist Lord Kelvin once observed: 
“When you can measure what you are speaking about, and express it in numbers, you know 
something about it. But when you cannot measure it, when you cannot express it in numbers, 
your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind.” Hence there has emerged a number 
of indices over the last decade or so to measure and represent the extent of globalisation in 
numbers (Maastricht Globalization World S, 2000; KOF Globalization Index, 2002; CSGR 
Globalisation Index, 2005; A.T. Kearney/Foreign Policy Magazine Globalization Index, 
2009; Ernst & Young Annual Globalization Index, 2009; DHL Global Connectedness Index, 
2016; are some of them). Most of them cover both economic and non-economic dimensions 
of globalisation and come up with global and country specific numbers/scores and/or 
rankings. In this paper we have used the KOF Globalisation Index. This is available for 195 
countries over the period 1970 to 2016, and covers economic, social, and political arenas of 
globalisation. We have used the Overall Globalisation Index(GI), the Economic Globalisation 
Index (EGI) and two of its sub-indices – Trade Globalisation Index (TGI) and Financial 
Globalisation Index (FGI). 
It is observed that globalisation is progressing across the world over the last two-and-half 
decades, though at varying pace (Table 1). High Income countries, especially in North 
America and Europe are relatively more globalised compared to the Low & Middle income 
countries in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. However, the pace of globalisation, as 
indicated by the increment in globalisation index has been highest for South and East Asia 
during the 1990-2015 period. Three other things emerge from the trends as evident from 
Tables 1 & 2. These are: 
a) The pace of globalisation has slackened since 2010; 
b) Economic Globalisation has occurred at a faster pace than political and social 
globalisation and so EGI is marginally higher than GI; and, 
c) Within the economic sphere, financial integration has surpassed trade globalisation as 
indicated by the increasing gap between FGI and TGI, especially since the turn of this 
century. 
But there is no denying the fact that the world has become much more a global village over 
the last quarter of a century, especially in the economic sphere. 
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IV. TRENDS IN OUTPUT & INCOME 
Global output has been growing at around 3-4 per cent per annum for most part of the last 
two decades (Table 3). The growth has been faster in the second half compared to the first, 
before slackening in the last three years. With consistently declining population growth rates, 
Per Capita Income has been steadily increasing and the rate of increase has itself increased 
over the years. However, most of economic growth has been contributed by Middle Income 
countries in Asia & Pacific which has experienced highest GDP and PCI growth rates during 
the last 25 years. North Africa also had an impressive GDP growth, but high population 
growth in this region negated much of this gain and so impact on PCI has been only marginal. 
The rise in PCI is definitely a welcome trend leading to higher personal income level in the 
developing world at the macro level in recent times. But one must examine whether such 
growth is percolating to the labour market as well leading to across the board improvement in 
living conditions of the masses. In absence of that, the fruits of economic growth will be 
shared by select few and inequality would increase. 
V. LABOUR MARKET OUTCOMES 
1. Work Participation, Employment, and Unemployment 
Growth in Labourforce has lagged behind population growth rate in most cases – as a result 
of which LFPR has come down (Table 4 & 5). Exceptions are the Arab States, NSW Europe 
and Latin America where Labourforce has increase at a faster rate compared to population, 
leading to increase in LFPR in these countries. 
While LFPR has declined, employment opportunities have decreased by a larger magnitude 
during 1990-2000 in almost the entire globe. In the new millennium, employment growth 
surpassed labourforce growth only in Central & West Asia, Africa, and Latin America. As a 
result, Worker Population ratio (WPR) has declined across the world over the last two 
decades. 
As a flip side therefore, unemployment rate has increased during 1990-2000 in almost all 
regions except North America. During the next 15 years, Unemployment Rate increased in 
East Asia, North America, NSW Europe and South Asia. In the last three years, 
Unemployment Rate has creeped up in Arab States, Central & West Asia, and Latin America 
too. 
Looking at the absolute number of employed and unemployed persons, we find that growth in 
unemployed persons has been faster than growth in number of employeds for most of the 
world over the 1990-2000 period, indicating that not only have the absolute number of 
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unemployed persons increased, the rate of rise has been higher than that of employed persons 
in most cases. The only exception was North America. During the next decade however, 
growth in absolute number of unemployeds surpassed that of employeds in Asia & Pacific, 
but not elsewhere. 
Thus, what is evident is that the phenomenal rise in GDP coupled with low population growth 
has resulted in rising PCI in major parts of the globe in recent times, and the rate of increase 
has itself increased over the last 25 years. But this striking economic boom (for which the 
pro-globalisation lobby claim the credit) has not been reflected in the labour market, 
especially in the low and middle income countries which now have Unemployment rates 
higher than what was in 1990, even though LFPR itself has declined. This is brought out 
more forcefully if we look at the elasticity of employment with respect to output over this 
period (Table 6). It is observed that the elasticity has not only remained low, it has decreased 
consistently throughout the 1990-2018 period in the entire globe except a brief period of 
2010-15 in the Americas and during 2015-18 in NSW Europe. 
VI. POSSIBLE EXPLANATION – CONVERGING TECHNOLOGY 
It is thus amply clear that the labour market is getting decoupled from the economic growth 
and the whole idea that globalisation led economic boom will create huge labour demand in 
developing countries has proved to be elusive. Why has the story run contrary to expectations 
and forecasts so emphatically made during early 1990s? We argue that this has to do with not 
globalisation per se but the process and vehicle of globalisation. Contrary to popular belief 
and expectations, globalisation, especially economic globalisation has gained ground much 
faster and wider. The unbridled march of economic globalisation has been accompanied by 
three factors: 
(i) Globalisation of money and finance capital at an unprecedented scale; 
(ii) Emergence of cross-continent global value chain; and, 
(iii) Homogenisation of consumer tastes & preferences across countries at the upper decile 
levels of income. 
Starting from the last one, consumers with high disposable income now desire and demand 
the same standard of commodities irrespective of whether they are residents of developed or 
developing countries. This is true for both consumer durables (notably electronics) and 
services (notably entertainment & leisure). Hence the latest mobile phones or washing 
machines or super bikes are as much in demand in say North America or West Europe as in 
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South or East Asia. Eating out and foreign travel is as much a common activity among rich 
Indians as among Europeans. 
This, coupled with the global value chain has led to standardisation of both the technical 
specifications of commodities and their production processes across continents. Production is 
increasingly targeted at the global market and not just the domestic market of the country 
where the factory is. In fact, this was the guiding factor of the HO model based globalisation 
policy where production was to be geared towards the export market. And when corporates 
are vying for the same ‘top of the pyramid’ markets across the globe, they have to be fiercely 
competitive, always on the lookout for cutting costs and improving productivity. 
These two phenomenon have been abetted by the first – excess supply of investible funds at 
the hands of corporates (mostly from the developed North) in search of newer areas of profit. 
Thus financial integration has surpassed trade globalisation and availability of global finance 
capital has led to adoption of ‘modern’ technology in manufacturing sector across the global 
South. Thus, instead of adopting labour intensive technology in labour surplus developing 
countries (a la HO theory and advocates of globalisation), we have increasingly witnessed 
capital intensive technology being put in place. This is borne out by the fact that Fixed 
Capital per worker has increased at 2 per cent per annum over the 1990-2018 period at the 
global level (Table 7). The rate of growth has been highest in the upper-middle income 
countries and lowest in the high income countries. Thus a convergence in Technology across 
countries has taken place (See Figure 1). 
This excessive proliferation of ‘advanced’ capital intensive technology in quest of global 
competitiveness and standardisation of value chains and markets has resulted in two 
divergent trends in the labour market. While labour productivity (GDP per worker) has 
almost doubled between 1990-2018, labour’s share in GDP has dropped from 53 per cent of 
GDP in 1990 to 51 per cent in 2018 (Table 8). In Asia & Pacific – where the pace of 
globalisation and participation in global value chain has been tremendous – labour 
productivity has trebled, while labour share in GDP has dropped below 50 per cent. 
This is mainly because of changes in the nature of employment during this period. With 
increasing globalisation and linking of production with global demand, uncertainties have 
become an omnipresent factor. Instabilities spread like wildfire across both sectors/markets 
and geographical location and the first casualty of any recessionary trend or cyclical slump, 
or bubble burst is the hapless working class. To keep the hiring and firing processes smooth 
and outside the purview of labour laws, there is an increasing trend to outsource work and 
create unorganised jobs in the organised sector. As a result, the share of wage worker has not 
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increased as much as expected – rising from 44 per cent in 1990 to just 52 per cent in 2018 
(Table 9). In South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, they remain below 30 per cent even in 
2018. Consequently not much dent could be made into the large mass of Vulnerable Workers 
(Own Account Workers and Family Labour) – workers without jobs that have regularity, 
stability or decent working conditions. What is more, large parts of the wage workers are 
casual workers – who are more akin to the vulnerable workers in view of their irregularity 
and instability of work and remuneration. 
The pitiable condition of workers is also reflected in the proportion of working poor – 
workers who earn less than a decent wage. Almost one-fifth of workers worldwide earn less 
than 3.2 USD per day (constant 2011 PPP USD) in 2018 – the proportion being as high as 43 
per cent in South Asia and 62 per cent in Sub-Saharan Africa (Table 10). Close to two-third 
of workers in Low income countries and two in every five workers in lower middle income 
countries earn less than decent wages. 
It can therefore be inferred that the rapid globalisation over the last quarter century has been 
accompanied by adoption of labour saving technology across the globe, as a result of which 
expansion & improvement of employment has not been up to the expected level. 
VII. ABORTED TRANSITION? 
It is also sometimes argued that developing countries over the last few decades have 
exhibited a peculiar process of economic transition. Rather than the classic Lewis/Kuznets 
type of gradual movement from an economy dominated by subsistence primary sector to an 
industrial one followed by the mature phase of tertiary sector driven economy, these 
economies have moved from primary to tertiary straight away. While some economists have 
championed this as a Skipping Process of development, others are not easily convinced. More 
so, since the argument for globalisation projected that the opening up of the economy would 
lead to rapid industrialisation in developing countries – led mainly by expansion of 
manufacturing industries. 
Experience however points to the contrary – share of industry in GDP has declined in almost 
all the regions of the world during 1990-2015 except a marginal rise in the Arab countries 
(Table 11). If we consider economic groups – share of industry in GDP has increased only in 
the Low income countries. Looked closer, both these increases have been fuelled not by a rise 
in manufacturing GDP but because of a rise in share of Construction, Mining & Utilities in 
GDP. This has been accompanied by a tremendous increase in the share of Services in GDP. 
While for the high income countries (mostly in Europe and North America), this is a 
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culmination of the economic transition process that they have been going through for most 
part of the last 50 years, for the developing world (Low and Lower middle income countries 
in rest of the world), this is a sure sign of Missing middle phase of economic transformation. 
As a result, most of the service sector activities in developing world are primitive services 
(retail trade, personal services, etc.) rather than post-industrialisation white collar service 
activities. Another marker of the aborted transition in these countries is that the increase in 
share of services in employment is far more than that in GDP – confirming that the services 
sector here are mostly low productive in nature (Table 12). 
It would therefore not be wrong to infer that the last twenty-five years has seen 
unprecedented global economic integration, financial flow and changes in technology. 
However, this has not resulted in any significant expansion of employment and reduction of 
unemployment rate in the developing world and instead of industrialisation (as expected & 
forecasted) there has happened a shift towards low productive service sector in the 
developing world. We shall next try to examine the association between globalisation indices 
and other macro indicators using country level data. 
VIII. LINKING GLOBALISATION & LABOUR MARKET PREDICAMENT 
One may argue that such trends may have come about without any link with globalisation. To 
examine this issue we have used the KOF Index of Globalisation. As mentioned earlier, this 
Index measures three main dimensions of globalization – Economic, Social, and Political, as 
well as providing an Overall Globalisation Index. We have used the Overall Globalisation 
Index(GI), the Economic Globalisation Index (EGI) and two of its sub-indices – Trade 
Globalisation Index (TGI) and Financial Globalisation Index (FGI). The macro indicators 
chosen are GDP growth rate, PCI Growth Rate, and Employment Growth Rate. 
It is observed that all the four globalisation indices are significantly negatively associated 
with employment growth rates all throughout (Table 13-15). The same is true for GDP 
growth rates, while the association with PCI Growth is mostly positive but insignificant. 
Similar type of association is observed between the employment variables and changes in 
globalisation indices, especially the negative relation between employment growth rate and 
pace of globalisation is noteworthy (Figure 2). It is thus evident that higher globalisation 
index is associated with poorer employment market conditions while at the same time not 
improving the PCI of the countries in any significant manner. 
When we examine the association across economic groups, we observe that the magnitude of 
the negative relation between changes in globalisation index and employment growth rate is 
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stronger for middle income countries than the high income countries – indicating that the 
post-globalisation shock to labour market has been higher in developing countries rather than 
in developed countries. 
IX. INDIAN SCENARIO 
1. Trends 
What has been the Indian scenario in this regard? It is observed that the situation and time 
trend in India has followed the same script as for the developing countries narrated above. 
The country and its economy has become more globalised, doubling the index values over the 
25 year period studied here (Table 16). GDP has clocked an impressive growth rate of above 
6 per cent per annum throughout this period, reaching up to 8.3 per cent during 2005-10 
(Table 17). As a result, Per Capita Income has also shown a remarkable rise during the same 
period. However, as commented by economists, PCI is not the income of the average citizen, 
rather it is the average income of the citizen, and there is a significant difference between the 
two! 
This economic boom has been accompanied by a steady fall in LFPR and WPR throughout, 
except a marginal blip during 2000-05. Absolute number of unemployed persons has grown 
at a rate higher than that of workers during this period. Vulnerable employment has remained 
above 75 per cent even after two decades of globalisation and economic flourish. 
Sectoral composition of GDP does not show any remarkable improvement in the share of 
industrial sector, which has stagnated around the 28-30 per cent mark while the share of 
services has inched closer to the halfway mark. Within the industrial sector, the share of 
Manufacturing has remained around a pathetic 16-18 percent mark. 
The process of rising GDP has depended mostly on induction of a more capital-intensive 
form of technology as Fixed Capital-Labour Ratio has more than trebled during this period. 
this has been mirrored by the movement of Labour Productivity (GDP per worker) which has 
also increased three-fold during 1990-2015. Elasticity of employment wrt GDP has come 
down from 0.5 during 1990-95 to 0.2 between 2010-15. 
If we decompose growth in GDP into its components – growth of Capital Productivity, 
growth of Capital-labour ratio (or technology), and growth of employment, certain interesting 
features are revealed. It is observed that throughout the 1990-2015 period, contribution of 
Capital productivity to GDP growth has been negligible, even negative occasionally. 
Employment growth had contributed modestly to GDP growth during 1990-95 but this 
contribution came down steadily over the study period, coming down to 5.5 per cent during 
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2005-10 and ending with 16.2 per cent during 2010-15. The bulk of GDP growth has been 
brought about by rise in Capital labour ratio. Technology improvement had contributed close 
to 60 per cent of GDP growth during 1990-95, its share rising steadily to more than 80 per 
cent during 2010-15. Thus the economic boom that we have witnessed over the last 25 years 
has mostly been a Capital driven growth with little impact on the employment situation. 
2. Possible Dynamics 
But what has been the driving force behind such a rapidly changing technology in the 
economy? We have already hinted at some of the possible dynamics earlier. First, 
globalisation in India, and elsewhere, has been accompanied by macroeconomic structural 
adjustment. This has laid undue stress on fiscal consolidation and with revenues stagnating, 
government expenditure has been tightened, even curtailed in so called non-economic 
avenues like education, health, subsidies etc. As a result there is a general stress on domestic 
demand in these economies, notwithstanding the rising consumerism of the upper deciles of 
income classes. This has meant that producers who cater mainly to the domestic market have 
been reluctant to expand output and employment by any significant amount. Second, export 
oriented sectors are always on the move to maintain a toehold in the fiercely competitive and 
unstable international market. Therefore, they invest more in machines than men and tend to 
cut down on labour costs in the short run and relocating production to least cost countries in 
the long run. The only section that benefits in this melee is the specialised skilled workers. 
Improved technology is mostly skill-intensive and creates increasing demand for skilled 
labour in the developing countries, supply of which remains limited due to bottlenecks in the 
education sector. Consequently, compensations offered to employees other than workers are 
astronomical, though still lower in comparison to developed countries. This increases income 
inequality in these countries, as observed by Wood (1994, 1998) and Vivarelli (2004). 
We can take a peek at this last issue if we examine the movements of factor prices in the 
organised manufacturing sector in India [similar exercises, though with a different focus, for 
earlier periods were done by Mathur & Mishra (2007) and Mukherjee & Majumder (2008)]. 
We have considered the following items from the Annual Survey of Industries: (a) Gross 
Value Added; (b) Foxed Capital; (c) Number of Workers; (d) Wages to Workers; (e) Number 
of Employees (excluding workers); (f) Compensation to Employees; (g) Total Persons 
Engaged; (h) Total Emoluments; (i) Outstanding Loan; (j) Interest Payments; (k) Invested 
capital; (l) Gross Profit; 
Using these, we can construct indicators of factor returns as follows: 
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(1) Wage per Worker; (2) Compensation per Employee; (3) Emolument per Person; (4) 
Interest-Loan ratio; (5) Profit-Invested capital ratio. (1), (2), and (3) are returns to wage-
workers, non-wage employees, and All Employees respectively. (4) is return to Borrowed 
Capital and can serve as an indicator of Returns to Capital. (5) may serve as an index of 
Return to Entrepreneurship. 
Using values at constant 2011-12 prices, we have computed indexed values of these factor 
returns for the 1990-2018 period (Table 19). In addition we have also computed Labour 
Productivity Index (GVA per employee) and Technology Index (Fixed Capital-Worker ratio). 
The following salient features can be observed from Table 19. Labour Productivity has 
shown tremendous growth during the last 25 years as GVA/worker in 2018 has become three 
times of what it was in 1990. The same is true for Technology (or K/L ratio) which has also 
trebled during this period. This has been accompanied by a consistent increase in 
Emoluments per Person which has become two-and-half times during the same period. 
However, what this figure masks is the disproportionate increase in income of high-level 
manpower or non-wage workers relative to the wage workers. While wages per worker has 
increased only 75 per cent during last 28 years, compensation per employee (excluding 
workers) has become almost four times! This has widened the disparity between wage 
workers and managerial cadre employees (skilled manpower?) in the period of globalisation, 
a sentiment shared earlier by Mathur & Mishra (2007). It is also to be noted that the gap 
between Productivity and Wages have also widened during this period (Figure 3), which was 
earlier observed to have narrowed down during 1970s and 1980 by Mathur and Mishra 
(2007). Profits as a proportion to Invested Capital has also increased faster that wages per 
worker. Thus returns to workers have exhibited the lowest increase during the last three 
decades of economic growth. 
However, what is of interest to us is the relative cost of labour and capital. We have chosen 
Interest on Outstanding Loan as an indicator of cost of capital. It is observed that cost of 
capital had increased marginally during 1990-2000, before falling substantially during the 
next decade. Only since 2010-11 cost of capital has increased again, but has still not reached 
the 1990 level. It is thus evident that Capital has seen a stagnant cost structure making Labour 
relatively dearer over the years. In fact, relative cost of labour (wages per worker is to 
interest/loan ratio) has become two and half times during the period of study. It is therefore 
quite natural that faced with rising labour cost and stagnant (and falling) capital cost 
entrepreneurs are substituting labour by capital. This in our opinion is the main reason behind 
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decoupling of employment from economic growth not only in India but across the globe in 
the period of rapid globalisation. 
X. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
It is thus evident that the process of globalisation has led to changes in the production 
processes, structure, and technology across the world. In the true spirit of globalisation, these 
changes have been similar across the globe – bringing in more capital intensive technology. 
This is coupled with increasing putting out of work to the unorganised sector and 
casualisation of workforce. As a result, while national and per capita income levels have 
increased, these have not transformed to large scale industrialisation or expansion or regular 
employment. Wages have increased, but failed to keep pace with productivity increase. 
Within the employed class, skilled managerial employees have benefitted substantially more 
compared to workers and inequality in the labour market may have increased. Instead of 
boosting the employment market in developing countries as forecasted by the proponents of 
Washington Consensus, globalisation process is leading to further squeezing of the labour 
market. In addition, the cure-all medicines called globalisation and technological upgradation 
has been accompanied by several side-effects like removal of social safety nets, declining 
support to employment guarantee schemes, and dismantling of workers’ rights, adding to the 
woes of the working class. With falling income in the hands of the toiling class and 
increasing inequality, it is but quite natural that none of the ‘booster doses’ of fiscal 
incentives are able to revive the decelerating wheels of the economy. And instead of listening 
to the grassroot researchers, governments across the globe seem to be following a path which 
has been aptly summarised by Joseph Stiglitz in the following words: 
“Globalization and trade liberalization were supposed to make us all better off 
through the mechanism of trickle-down economics. What we seemed to be seeing 
instead was trickle-up economics, accompanied by a destruction of democratic 
politics, as we moved ever closer to a system of “one dollar, one vote” as opposed to 
“one person, one vote.”     [Stiglitz, 2016] 
It is time to pay heed to saner academic voices [for example Patnaik (2017) and Sen (2018)] 
and give a boost to domestic demand through larger government expenditure, rather than 
stick to a neo-liberal supply side fetish. 
________________________ 
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Trends in Globalisation Indices 
Country Groups 
Overall Globalisation Index Economic Globalisation Index 
1990 2000 2010 2015 1990 2000 2010 2015 
World 45.4 50.4 56.7 58.2 48.6 55.8 59.5 60.8 
East Asia & Pacific 44.4 50.7 56.0 58.0 53.3 60.6 62.4 63.9 
Europe & Central Asia 58.2 60.8 68.5 69.7 48.4 62.1 69.6 71.4 
Latin Am & Caribbean 45.3 49.4 54.1 54.7 50.4 54.1 55.9 57.2 
Mid East & North Africa 48.9 51.6 59.9 59.7 54.8 57.3 63.1 61.5 
North America 62.5 66.5 68.2 69.2 48.0 56.8 58.2 59.7 
South Asia 33.7 38.7 44.9 47.3 35.0 38.2 39.0 38.3 
Sub-Saharan Africa 35.4 39.2 45.5 48.2 44.3 49.6 51.4 53.6 
Low income 30.4 33.6 41.7 43.9 36.7 41.6 45.0 46.9 
Lower middle income 38.0 43.7 49.8 52.3 46.6 53.9 55.4 55.8 
Upper middle income 44.8 49.5 56.7 58.2 48.9 54.6 58.0 59.2 
High income 57.8 63.3 68.5 68.6 56.4 65.6 71.2 73.0 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Dreher (2006) and Gygli et al (2019). 
 
Table 2 
Trends in Components of Economic Globalisation Indices 
Country Groups 
Trade Globalisation Index Financial Globalisation Index 
1990 2000 2010 2015 1990 2000 2010 2015 
World 47.8 53.7 55.8 56.4 49.7 57.6 63.1 65.0 
East Asia & Pacific 52.9 59.2 56.9 57.6 50.6 58.6 67.3 69.8 
Europe & Central Asia 45.0 60.2 62.7 65.0 53.9 64.4 76.4 77.4 
Latin Am & Caribbean 49.5 49.0 50.7 51.1 52.5 59.9 61.6 63.6 
Mid East & North Africa 53.2 55.8 62.9 60.3 56.2 58.6 63.2 62.6 
North America 31.5 35.3 33.1 34.1 64.5 78.4 83.3 85.3 
South Asia 40.0 43.7 41.5 39.5 29.9 32.7 36.5 37.1 
Sub-Saharan Africa 44.9 48.4 51.9 52.5 43.6 50.7 50.8 54.7 
Low income 37.1 41.3 47.8 47.0 36.5 42.1 42.3 46.8 
Lower middle income 47.0 54.4 54.9 54.1 46.0 53.3 55.9 57.4 
Upper middle income 51.0 55.0 55.4 55.9 46.5 53.7 60.2 61.9 
High income 51.0 58.2 60.5 62.9 61.9 72.1 81.8 82.8 





Global Growth Rates of GDP, Population and Per Capita Income 1990-2018 (% pa) 
Country Groups 















 2000 - 
15 
 2015 - 
18 
WORLD 2.8 3.7 3.6 1.8 1.6 1.3 1.0 2.0 2.3 
Africa 2.4 4.7 3.2 2.9 2.7 2.8 -0.5 1.9 0.4 
Americas 3.2 2.2 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.3 1.4 0.6 0.5 
Arab States 4.1 4.2 1.7 3.7 3.9 2.5 0.3 0.4 -0.9 
Asia & Pacific 4.4 5.9 5.5 2.0 1.6 1.1 2.4 4.2 4.3 
Europe & Central Asia 1.1 2.1 2.4 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.4 1.6 2.1 
Central & W Asia 1.8 5.5 4.4 1.8 1.8 1.5 0.0 3.6 2.8 
Eastern Asia 4.6 6.2 5.2 1.4 1.1 0.4 3.2 5.0 4.8 
Eastern Europe -2.0 3.5 2.2 0.4 -0.1 -0.4 -2.4 3.6 2.6 
Latin Am & the Carib 2.9 2.9 0.9 2.3 1.9 1.5 0.5 1.0 -0.5 
Northern Africa 2.9 3.7 3.9 2.9 2.2 1.8 0.0 1.5 2.1 
Northern America 3.4 1.8 2.2 1.1 1.1 0.9 2.3 0.7 1.3 
N, S & W Europe 2.0 1.2 2.1 0.5 0.5 0.3 1.5 0.7 1.8 
SE Asia & Pacific 3.9 4.8 4.7 2.4 1.8 1.4 1.4 3.0 3.2 
Southern Asia 4.3 6.1 6.8 2.6 2.2 1.8 1.7 3.9 5.0 
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.0 5.4 2.6 2.9 2.9 3.1 -0.9 2.4 -0.4 
High income 2.7 1.9 2.1 0.9 0.9 0.6 1.8 1.0 1.5 
Low income 1.9 4.4 3.6 2.9 3.0 3.0 -1.0 1.4 0.6 
Lower-middle income 3.3 6.1 5.7 2.5 2.1 1.8 0.8 3.9 3.8 
Upper-middle income 2.9 5.8 4.5 1.7 1.3 0.8 1.2 4.5 3.7 
BRICS 3.6 7.2 5.5 1.8 1.5 1.0 1.8 5.6 4.5 
European Union 28 2.1 1.4 2.3 0.5 0.4 0.2 1.6 1.0 2.1 




Growth in Labourforce, Workers and Unemployed Persons - 1990-2018 
Country Groups 



















WORLD 1.5 1.3 1.1 1.4 1.3 1.2 3.8 1.0 -0.6 
Africa 2.6 2.6 2.8 2.5 2.8 2.9 3.6 1.0 2.4 
Americas 1.9 1.5 1.2 1.8 1.5 1.1 2.7 0.5 3.4 
Arab States 3.2 4.2 2.7 3.1 4.2 2.6 3.3 3.5 3.6 
Asia & Pacific 1.6 1.1 0.8 1.5 1.0 0.9 4.6 1.8 -1.0 
Europe & Central Asia 0.2 0.6 0.3 -0.1 0.7 0.8 3.6 -0.3 -6.5 
Central & W Asia 1.0 2.0 1.9 0.4 2.1 1.8 8.6 0.7 2.6 
Eastern Asia 1.0 0.5 0.0 0.9 0.4 0.0 4.9 2.2 -1.8 
Eastern Europe -0.3 -0.1 -0.6 -0.9 0.3 -0.1 6.3 -3.6 -8.4 
Latin Am & the Carib 2.4 2.0 1.5 2.0 2.2 1.0 6.6 -0.2 8.2 
Northern Africa 2.5 2.1 1.5 2.3 2.4 1.7 3.9 0.7 -0.1 
Northern America 1.2 0.7 0.8 1.5 0.6 1.3 -3.9 2.3 -8.0 
N, S & W Europe 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.5 1.1 0.8 1.5 -8.3 
SE Asia & Pacific 2.2 1.7 1.1 2.1 1.7 1.1 6.1 -0.3 0.2 
Southern Asia 2.2 1.7 1.8 2.1 1.7 1.9 3.3 2.3 -0.2 
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.6 2.7 3.1 2.6 2.8 3.1 3.5 1.2 3.3 
High income 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.2 0.9 0.7 -6.9 
Low income 2.6 2.7 3.1 2.5 2.8 3.1 4.5 2.0 1.3 
Lower-middle income 2.2 1.7 1.7 2.0 1.8 1.8 5.1 1.2 0.3 
Upper-middle income 1.2 0.9 0.4 1.1 0.9 0.3 4.8 0.8 1.7 
BRICS 1.4 0.9 0.5 1.2 0.8 0.5 4.8 1.4 1.2 
European Union 28 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.5 1.1 1.0 0.6 -9.9 




Labour-force Participation, Employment and Unemployment Rates 1990-2018 (%) 
Country Groups 
LFPR Worker-Population Ratio UNEMP Rate 
1990 2000 2018 1990 2000 2018 1990 2000 2018 
WORLD 65.6 64.7 61.7 62.7 61.1 58.5 4.4 5.5 5.2 
Africa 64.5 64.3 63.3 59.4 58.7 58.9 7.9 8.8 6.9 
Americas 62.9 64.4 63.4 58.8 59.8 59.5 6.6 7.1 6.2 
Arab States 49.7 48.8 51.0 45.8 44.9 47.4 7.7 7.8 7.1 
Asia & Pacific 68.6 67.2 62.1 66.9 64.9 59.8 2.5 3.4 3.8 
Europe & Central Asia 59.7 57.5 58.3 55.5 51.8 53.3 7.0 9.8 8.5 
Central & W Asia 60.2 56.5 58.2 57.3 51.0 53.5 4.7 9.7 8.0 
Eastern Asia 76.6 75.0 68.8 74.8 72.4 65.7 2.4 3.5 4.5 
Eastern Europe 63.7 59.2 59.2 59.7 52.5 55.3 5.9 11.3 6.6 
Latin Am & the Carib 60.9 63.1 64.1 57.5 57.3 59.8 6.1 9.2 6.6 
Northern Africa 47.4 47.2 46.8 41.1 39.9 41.0 13.5 15.4 12.4 
Northern America 65.6 66.3 62.4 60.5 63.5 59.0 7.2 4.3 5.5 
N, S & W Europe 56.8 56.6 57.7 52.1 51.6 51.9 8.4 8.8 10.0 
SE Asia & Pacific 68.1 69.1 67.9 66.6 66.3 65.9 2.8 4.0 3.0 
Southern Asia 57.8 56.8 52.9 56.1 55.1 51.2 2.7 3.0 3.3 
Sub-Saharan Africa 69.7 69.6 67.9 65.0 64.4 63.9 6.8 7.4 5.9 
High income 60.6 60.6 60.3 56.6 56.5 56.3 6.7 6.8 6.7 
Low income 74.3 73.8 71.3 71.6 70.6 68.5 3.6 4.3 3.9 
Lower-middle income 60.0 59.6 56.7 58.0 56.9 54.3 3.4 4.5 4.2 
Upper-middle income 71.8 69.9 65.5 68.7 65.8 61.7 4.1 5.8 5.8 
BRICS 70.0 68.0 62.0 67.8 65.1 59.2 3.1 4.3 4.6 
European Union 28 57.6 56.5 57.4 52.8 51.3 52.0 8.6 9.3 9.4 
Source: Author’s calculations based on ILO (2019) and World Bank (2019). 
Notes: LFPR – Labour Force Participation Rate as % of 15+ age group Population; 
EMPR – Employment Rate as % of 15+ age group Population; UNEMR – 
























WORLD 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.4 
Africa 2.1 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.9 1.0 0.6 
Americas 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.7 
Arab States 0.8 0.7 0.9 1.3 0.8 1.6 0.8 1.0 
Asia & Pacific 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 
Europe & Central Asia 1.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 -0.1 0.3 
Central & W Asia -0.8 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.4 
Eastern Asia 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 
Eastern Europe 0.2 -0.3 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.1 
Latin Am & the Carib 0.8 0.7 1.0 0.6 0.7 1.0 0.7 0.8 
Northern Africa 1.2 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.8 0.6 
Northern America 0.5 0.4 0.2 -0.3 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.3 
N, S & W Europe -0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.4 
SE Asia & Pacific 0.4 0.8 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.4 
Southern Asia 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.3 
Sub-Saharan Africa 3.4 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.7 1.2 1.3 0.5 
High income 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.5 
Low income 3.7 0.8 0.6 0.5 1.0 0.9 1.3 0.6 
Lower-middle income 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.3 
Upper-middle income 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.2 
BRICS 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1 
European Union 28 -0.5 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.4 








Growth in Gross Capital per Worker (% pa) 
2018 1990-2000 2000-2010 2010-2018 1990-2018 
WORLD 100 1.7 2.0 1.8 2.0 
Africa 29 -0.8 0.6 1.2 0.3 
Americas 155 0.9 0.9 0.4 0.7 
Arab States 211 -0.6 1.4 1.7 0.9 
Asia & Pacific 77 4.1 4.5 3.9 4.5 
Europe & Central Asia 212 2.2 1.1 0.5 1.3 
Central & W Asia 105 3.2 1.9 2.2 2.6 
Eastern Asia 106 4.8 5.6 4.8 5.4 
Eastern Europe 134 2.0 0.6 0.8 1.2 
Latin Am & the Carib 89 0.6 0.3 1.1 0.7 
Northern Africa 74 0.0 1.0 1.8 1.0 
Northern America 265 1.4 1.9 0.1 1.2 
N, S & W Europe 297 1.7 1.3 0.4 1.2 
SE Asia & Pacific 77 4.2 1.9 2.5 3.1 
Southern Asia 41 2.3 4.7 3.0 3.6 
Sub-Saharan Africa 22 -1.3 0.1 1.2 0.0 
High income 268 2.0 1.5 0.4 1.4 
Low income 10 -0.3 1.8 3.2 1.7 
Lower-middle income 43 2.2 3.2 2.8 2.9 
Upper-middle income 96 2.3 4.1 4.1 3.7 
BRICS 75 2.6 5.5 4.7 4.6 
European Union 28 275 2.2 1.5 0.5 1.5 
Source: Author’s calculations based on World Bank (2019). 





Growth in Labour Productivity and Labour Share in GDP - 1990-2018 
Country Groups 
GDP per Worker Index
@ 
Labour Share in GDP 
2005 2010 2015 2018 2005 2010 2015 2018 
WORLD 128 145 162 174 53.0 52.2 51.8 51.4 
Africa 112 126 131 132 46.4 45.7 47.9 47.4 
Americas 119 122 126 129 57.0 56.0 56.6 56.1 
Arab States 112 106 109 106 28.4 28.5 30.9 32.2 
Asia & Pacific 163 215 268 307 50.1 49.1 49.3 49.0 
Europe & Central Asia 125 131 139 145 56.2 57.0 54.8 54.6 
Central & W Asia 138 155 185 200 40.4 41.0 40.6 39.9 
Eastern Asia 184 254 330 384 51.9 50.1 52.2 52.0 
Eastern Europe 115 133 145 155 48.9 52.1 49.2 50.1 
Latin Am & the Carib 108 116 120 120 48.3 49.0 51.1 50.5 
Northern Africa 114 124 129 138 40.5 38.8 40.3 39.7 
Northern America 132 139 145 149 60.7 59.4 59.3 58.8 
N, S & W Europe 123 126 131 134 60.3 61.1 59.5 59.0 
SE Asia & Pacific 141 160 186 207 45.0 44.6 43.3 42.6 
Southern Asia 144 193 234 270 49.9 50.2 46.5 46.1 
Sub-Saharan Africa 111 127 137 135 50.9 50.7 52.7 52.4 
High income 130 134 140 144 - - - - 
Low income 103 119 120 121 - - - - 
Lower-middle income 136 173 211 237 - - - - 
Upper-middle income 152 201 247 279 - - - - 
BRICS 167 242 315 365 52.2 51.8 52.0 51.6 
European Union 28 129 132 138 143 59.2 59.8 57.8 57.6 
Source: Author’s calculations based on ILO (2019) and World Bank (2019). 



















WORLD 2.8 44.0 53.2 3.0 52.0 45.0 
Africa 3.3 24.7 72.1 3.2 28.6 68.2 
Americas 4.5 72.6 23.0 3.7 74.4 21.9 
Arab States 4.4 70.8 24.8 3.5 81.2 15.4 
Asia & Pacific 2.2 30.7 67.1 2.6 44.9 52.6 
Europe & Central Asia 3.2 80.9 16.0 3.4 82.3 14.4 
Central & W Asia 3.4 51.3 45.3 3.7 64.2 32.1 
Eastern Asia 2.5 36.4 61.2 2.9 56.6 40.5 
Eastern Europe 1.2 89.2 9.6 1.9 88.1 10.0 
Latin Am & the Carib 5.0 58.1 36.9 4.3 63.1 32.6 
Northern Africa 9.0 54.8 36.2 7.0 63.9 29.2 
Northern America 3.9 90.4 5.7 2.7 92.8 4.5 
N, S & W Europe 4.7 82.0 13.3 4.3 84.8 11.0 
SE Asia & Pacific 2.4 33.5 64.1 3.2 51.6 45.2 
Southern Asia 1.8 18.9 79.3 1.9 26.5 71.6 
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.1 18.9 79.0 2.5 22.6 74.8 
High income 4.1 82.6 13.3 3.3 87.2 9.5 
Low income 1.4 15.5 83.2 1.6 18.8 79.5 
Lower-middle income 2.3 25.4 72.2 2.7 34.5 62.9 
Upper-middle income 2.7 42.7 54.6 3.3 59.2 37.5 
BRICS 2.3 32.6 65.2 2.6 45.5 51.9 
European Union 28 4.4 81.3 14.3 4.1 84.5 11.4 





Working Poor: 1990-2018 
Country Group 
% Workers earning less than 3.2 USD PPP per day 
1990 2000 2010 2015 2018 
WORLD 53.9 47.8 31.6 22.7 21.0 
Africa 68.4 67.3 60.6 56.4 54.9 
Americas 13.2 11.2 6.1 4.5 4.2 
Arab States 16.9 8.9 7.8 13.5 15.9 
Asia & Pacific 73.8 62.6 38.5 24.2 21.3 
Europe & Central Asia 5.9 6.4 2.8 2.4 2.2 
Central & W Asia 27.3 30.6 17.6 13.9 12.5 
Eastern Asia 74.1 57.8 25.1 7.5 6.0 
Eastern Europe 5.5 5.9 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Latin Am & the Carib 23.8 19.8 9.9 7.2 6.8 
Northern Africa 31.3 23.2 16.9 11.4 10.6 
Northern America 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
N, S & W Europe 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
SE Asia & Pacific 64.5 56.7 30.4 21.8 17.1 
Southern Asia 77.9 73.4 61.7 48.1 43.0 
Sub-Saharan Africa 75.6 75.7 69.2 64.4 62.4 
High income 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Low income 81.4 80.6 71.8 67.8 65.7 
Lower-middle income 72.7 69.0 53.7 42.3 37.8 
Upper-middle income 62.4 48.1 19.7 6.3 5.2 
BRICS 75.4 63.2 38.1 22.0 19.6 
European Union 28 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 





Sectoral shares of GDP 1995-2018 
Country Groups 
Share of Industry (%) Share of Services (%) 
1995 2005 2015 2018 1995 2005 2015 2018 
World 31.9 28.6 25.6 25.5 61.6 61.4 64.9 65.0 
North America 23.6 22.0 19.1 18.2 71.0 72.9 75.9 77.4 
Europe & Central Asia 27.6 24.9 23.1 23.3 59.5 62.3 64.5 64.3 
European Union 26.6 23.7 22.0 21.9 60.9 64.3 66.0 66.0 
Cen Europe & Baltics 32.0 29.6 29.4 28.5 49.8 54.6 55.7 56.8 
Arab World 41.3 51.9 41.0 45.0 44.8 39.7 52.5 48.7 
Middle East & N Africa 40.0 49.1 38.5 39.2 47.7 44.1 54.7 54.0 
Sub-Saharan Africa 29.8 28.8 24.4 24.1 44.5 48.0 53.1 52.4 
South Asia 27.4 28.7 26.4 26.2 39.1 45.7 48.9 49.9 
East Asia & Pacific 38.7 37.0 33.9 33.9 55.4 55.4 59.4 59.8 
Latin Am & Caribb 28.2 30.1 24.6 24.2 56.8 54.4 60.2 60.3 
High income 26.8 25.0 22.9 22.8 67.3 67.3 69.6 69.8 
Low income 18.0 26.2 22.5 24.9 37.3 41.1 41.9 39.3 
Lower middle income 31.2 32.4 29.0 28.9 40.7 45.2 48.9 49.0 
Upper middle income 37.6 38.6 33.1 33.3 47.6 47.6 54.8 55.3 
Source: Author’s calculations based on World Bank (2019). 
 
Table 12 
Sectoral shares of Employment 1995-2018 
Country Groups 
Share of Industry (%) Share of Services (%) 
1995 2005 2015 2018 1995 2005 2015 2018 
World 21.8 21.6 23.2 22.9 36.8 41.3 47.6 48.8 
North America 24.8 22.3 19.9 19.4 72.4 76.2 78.7 79.1 
Europe & Central Asia 29.9 27.2 24.8 24.6 54.2 61.1 65.8 66.6 
European Union 31.1 27.6 24.1 23.9 59.7 66.3 71.4 72.0 
Cen Europe & Baltics 33.5 31.9 30.8 31.6 44.1 52.1 57.8 58.4 
Arab World 21.8 21.8 24.1 24.3 46.3 50.9 54.4 54.3 
Middle East & N Africa 25.0 24.5 26.5 26.7 48.5 52.2 56.2 56.4 
Sub-Saharan Africa 9.9 9.9 11.0 11.3 27.4 28.9 33.8 34.1 
South Asia 15.4 18.4 23.5 23.8 23.8 27.0 31.4 32.7 
East Asia & Pacific 23.7 23.9 26.5 26.2 29.1 35.2 45.2 47.4 
Latin Am & Caribb 21.8 21.5 21.6 21.0 55.9 59.2 64.2 65.0 
High income 29.1 25.4 22.9 22.5 65.1 70.7 73.9 74.5 
Low income 8.6 9.3 11.0 11.4 19.4 21.2 25.6 25.8 
Lower middle income 15.9 17.9 21.6 21.9 28.9 31.7 36.9 38.2 
Upper middle income 24.8 25.0 27.1 26.6 32.5 39.4 49.8 51.7 





Association between Globalisation Index & Employment Indicators 
Indicator GDP growth PCI growth 
Employment 
growth 
Economic Globalisation 1990  0.120  0.202
* -0.170* 
Economic Globalisation 2000 -0.080  0.045 -0.214
** 
Economic Globalisation 2010 -0.167
*  0.007 -0.213** 
Trade Globalisation 1990  0.103  0.186
* -0.180* 
Trade Globalisation 2000  0.053  0.157
* -0.187* 
Trade Globalisation 2010 -0.149
*  0.024 -0.198** 
Financial Globalisation 1990  0.122  0.187
* -0.126 
Financial Globalisation 2000 -0.194
** -0.073 -0.204** 
Financial Globalisation 2010 -0.162
* -0.004 -0.202** 
Overall Globalisation 1990  0.063  0.183
* -0.304** 
Overall Globalisation 2000 -0.254
** -0.045 -0.378** 
Overall Globalisation 2010 -0.237
** -0.009 -0.352** 
Change in Economic Glob Index 1990-2015 -0.109 0.343
** -0.372** 
Change in Trade Glob Index 1990-2015 -0.157
* 0.331** -0.430** 
Change in Financial Glob Index 1990-2015 -0.168
* 0.284** -0.425** 
Change in Overall Glob Index 1990-2015  -0.136 0.326
** -0.396** 
Source: Author’s calculations based on sources cited above. 
 
Table 14 










 1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010 
Arab States -0.301 0.377 0.218 -0.383 0.482 0.003 -0.340 0.471 -0.173 -0.367 0.381 0.136 
Cent & W Asia 0.952 -0.454 -0.352 0.861 -0.445 -0.701* 0.639 -0.181 -0.638* 0.125 -0.613* -0.646* 
Eastern Asia -0.718 -0.731 -0.527 -0.327 0.037 0.483 0.066 0.359 0.305 -0.631 -0.248 0.611 
Eastern Europe -0.290 -0.042 0.270 -0.178 0.237 0.548 -0.222 0.377 0.417 -0.131 0.050 0.542 
Latin Am & Carib -0.189 -0.202 -0.142 -0.078 -0.185 -0.131 -0.154 -0.310 0.117 0.028 -0.020 -0.330 
Northern Africa -0.398 -0.244 -0.961** -0.076 -0.473 -0.828* -0.131 -0.197 -0.953** 0.002 -0.606 -0.072 
Northern America na na na na na na na na na na na na 
NSW Europe 0.355 0.443* 0.006 0.329 0.446* 0.438* 0.353 0.418* 0.500** 0.262 0.411* 0.295 
SE Asia & Pacific 0.181 0.122 0.250 0.264 0.274 0.403 0.003 0.086 0.264 0.390 0.368 0.449 
Southern Asia -0.161 -0.642 -0.661 0.115 0.067 0.130 0.029 0.339 0.318 0.194 -0.182 -0.027 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.203 -0.380* 0.031 0.022 -0.089 0.170 0.118 -0.010 0.147 -0.059 -0.147 0.166 
             
Low Income 0.117 -0.306 0.009 0.050 0.075 0.107 0.177 0.125 0.178 -0.075 0.030 0.033 
Lower-middle Income 0.344* -0.404** -0.195 0.212 -0.395** 0.032 0.095 -0.372* -0.122 0.251 -0.278 0.207 
Upper-middle Income -0.140 -0.351* -0.247 0.214 -0.088 -0.023 0.054 -0.171 -0.050 0.292 0.014 0.024 
High Income -0.255 -0.451** -0.443** -0.098 -0.088 -0.196 -0.069 0.047 -0.085 -0.103 -0.203 -0.286* 
Source: Author’s calculations based on ILO (2008) and World Bank (2008). 





Association between Change in Globalisation Indices and Macro-variables 
Indicators 
Country groups by 
income 















High income -0.028 -0.076 -0.094 -0.055 
Low income   0.244  0.033 -0.023  0.077 
Lower-middle income -0.440** -0.412** -0.532** -0.250 
Upper-middle income -0.108 -0.109 -0.057 -0.160 
PCI growth 
1990-2015 
High income  0.299*  0.378**  0.368**  0.361** 
Low income  0.140  0.035  0.004  0.057 
Lower-middle income  0.377**  0.334*  0.206  0.420** 




High income -0.199 -0.300* -0.315* -0.266* 
Low income  0.246 -0.076 -0.145  0.010 
Lower-middle income -0.678** -0.606** -0.587** -0.557** 






Trends in Basic Indicators for India 
Indicator 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 
Overall Globalisation Index 38.2 46.1 57.0 58.6 41.2 51.7 
Economic Globalisation Index 17.3 26.8 38.4 38.4 21.7 34.8 
Trade Globalisation Index 20.3 28.3 39.4 37.8 22.5 39.6 
Financial Globalisation Index 14.3 25.2 37.3 39.1 20.9 30.0 
       
Per Capita Income@  2857 3214 3823 4729 6373 8069 
LFPR (%) 58.6 58.5 57.5 58.5 54.1 52.2 
WPR (%) 57.4 56.9 55.9 56.7 52.4 50.4 
Unempt Rate (%) 2.1 2.6 2.7 3.1 3.1 3.4 
Vulnerable Employment^ 83.7 83.1 83.7 83 82.1 78.0 
       
Gross Capital-Worker Ratioa 15490 17791 21424 25986 38599 50585 
GDP per Worker Index# 4877 5645 6836 8343 12078 15898 
Labour Share in GDP na na na 58.0 56.8 49.2 
Manufacturing share in GDP 16.6 17.9 15.9 16.0 17.0 15.6 
Industry share in GDP 27.4 28.5 27.3 29.5 30.7 27.3 
Services share in GDP 35.9 37.7 42.5 44.4 45.0 47.8 
Working Poorb 45.6 43.7 40.4 35.1 28.0 16.4 
Notes: @ - at 2011 constant international PPP $; # - indexed with 1990 = 100; ^ - Own account workers and 




Growth of Basic Indicators for India 
Indicators 
Annual average growth rate (% pa) 
1990-95 1995-2000 2000-05 2005-10 2010-15 
GDP 4.9 6.1 6.7 8.3 6.8 
Population 2.4 2.5 2.3 2.0 1.9 
Per Capita Income 2.4 3.5 4.3 6.1 4.8 
Labourforce 2.4 2.1 2.6 0.5 1.2 
Workers 2.3 2.0 2.5 0.5 1.1 
Unemployed 6.7 3.0 5.3 0.4 3.1 
Capital per Worker 2.8 3.8 3.9 8.2 5.6 
Elasticity of Empl wrt GDP 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.2 
 
Table 18 
Decomposing GDP growth in India 
Components 1990-95 1995-2000 2000-05 2005-10 2010-15 
GDP growth 4.9 6.1 6.7 8.3 6.8 
In which contribution of      
 Capital Productivity -5.2 1.8 1.8 -4.6 1.2 
 Capital-labour ratio 57.8 62.3 58.6 99.0 81.7 























1990-91 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1995-96 134 110 109 111 154 102 109 134 
2000-01 150 127 108 162 106 114 112 154 
2005-06 215 131 101 192 349 66 196 162 
2010-11 245 163 117 254 278 75 218 217 
2015-16 285 227 161 350 228 98 233 287 
2018-19 295 250 176 397 224 99 254 298 
Note: All Values at constant 2011-12 prices. Relative labour Cost is calculated as ratio between Total Emolument per Person 
Engaged and Interest per unit of Outstanding Loan; Capital-Labour Ratio is measured as Fixed Capital per Employee. 




Globalisation and Technological Convergence 
 





Pace of Globalisation and Employment Growth 
  
  





Macro indicators for India 
 
 
Source: Author’s creation based on dataset mentioned 
 
 
